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FREE SPEECH IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
AND ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A 
CONSIDERATION OF MILL, 
MEIKLEJOHN, AND PLATO 
Murray Dry* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Constitution's success, according to its Foun-
ders, required that the people understand the document. One 
telling argument for adding a bill of rights to the Constitution 
was that "if a nation means its systems, religious or political, shall 
have duration, it ought to recognize the leading principles of 
them in the front page of every family book."t If we assume this 
is true for constitutional law as well, the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of freedom of speech is cause for our concern. Not only 
has the Court decided controversial free speech cases with in-
creasingly complicated doctrines, but it has extended protection 
to expressive activities which citizens do not ordinarily associate 
with freedom of speech. For example, in 1992 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a bias motivated crime ordinance under which 
a young man was convicted for having burned a cross inside the 
fenced yard of a black family.z While the decision was unani-
mous, only a bare majority of the Court agreed on the reasoning: 
while the prohibited expression came under the "fighting words" 
categorical exception to protected speech, the "content neutral-
ity" rule should be applied nonetheless; under that rule the ordi-
nance failed, since certain, but not all, "fighting words" were 
selected for prohibition on the basis of the message conveyed.3 
Similarly, even when a government regulation is upheld, what 
* Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. I wish to thank Eve Adler, 
Paul Dry, Russell Leng, Todd Molz, and Jim Stoner for reading and commenting on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
1. Federal Farmer XVI, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 
324 (U. of Chicago, 1981). 
2. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 504 U.S. - (1992). 
3. Id. at 2548-50. 
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the Justices call "protected expression" is at times hard to square 
with the high-toned justifications for protecting free speech. The 
major free speech case in 1991 involved nude dancing at the Kitty 
Kat Lounge.4 In a 5-4 decision upholding a public indecency 
statute that prohibited nude dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge, a 
majority of the Court was unable to affirm that the government's 
interest in banning nudity in places of public accommodations 
was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Justice Sou-
ter, who cast the deciding vote, wrote that "such performance 
dancing is inherently expressive," and thus "subject to a degree 
of first amendment protection," but he went on to explain his 
vote with reference to "the State's substantial interest in combat-
ing the secondary effects [e.g., likelihood of prostitution] of 
[such] adult entertainment establishments."s First Amendment 
scholar Frederick Schauer attributes the reasoning in cases such 
as R.A. V. and Barnes to "the process of abstraction" whereby 
Nazis become political speakers, profit maximizing purveyors 
of sexually explicit material become proponents of an alter-
nate vision of social existence, glorifiers of sexual violence 
against women become advocates of a point of view, quiet res-
idential streets become public forums, and negligently false 
harmful statements about private matters become part of a ro-
bust debate about issues of public importance.6 
The Supreme Court has drawn much of its understanding of 
freedom of speech from the famous Holmes-Brandeis opinions in 
the "subversive advocacy" cases from 1919-1927. These opinions 
assumed that the "marketplace of ideas" should be perfectly free 
of governmental restraint, because truth will win out and the best 
response to harmful speech is more speech, unless there is a 
"clear and present danger" of a substantive evil that government 
has a right to prohibit.7 The most recent development of this 
doctrine permits government to outlaw advocacy only when it "is 
4. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 501 U.S. - (1991). 
5. Id. at 2468. 
6. Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 397 (1989), a review of Kalven's posthumously published book, Harry Kalven, Jr., A 
Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (Harper & Row, 1988). 
7. "[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out." 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); and Whitney v. California, 274 
u.s. 357 (1927). 
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directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action. "s 
This development is part of a treatment of freedom of 
speech which starts by distinguishing categories of unprotected 
speech, including incitement, obscenity, and "fighting words," 
from all other speech, which is protected. Protected speech can-
not be prohibited and can only be regulated, as part of a "time, 
place and manner" regulation or as incidental to a regulation of 
conduct, if the regulation is "content" and "viewpoint" neutral. 
This means that protected speech cannot be treated differently 
on the basis of subject matter or point of view. As a result of the 
"hate speech" decision discussed above, the content neutrality 
rule now applies even to unprotected speech. When both sym-
bolic expression, such as draft card or flag burning, and offensive 
expression, such as wearing "F_ the Draft" on a jacket in a pub-
lic place, are included within the First Amendment, we arrive at 
our current legal condition on free speech. Do we really believe 
that such an extensive freedom of expression is good for our pol-
ity, that the truth, whatever that might mean as applied to nude 
dancing or cross burning, wins out, and that no harm results from 
such enforced permissiveness? To begin a reconsideration of 
these questions, I want to examine the philosophic source of our 
current views on free expression. 
Modern political philosophy, as developed in the writings of 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, has pro-
vided the foundation for our Constitution and for modern liberal 
constitutionalism generally. Government's purpose is limited to 
the securing of individual rights and its authority comes from the 
people, who give their consent (in the versions of Locke and 
Montesquieu, which the American Founders followed) via repre-
sentatives. In addition, the powers of government are arranged 
in and divided among different branches, which include a separa-
tion of powers among the political branches of government and 
an independent judiciary. 
Turning specifically to freedom of speech, while Spinoza, 
Locke, and Montesquieu discuss the subject in a manner consis-
tent with their emphasis on securing rights, John Stuart Mill 
(whose teaching draws on the previous philosophers) and Alex-
ander Meiklejohn are the most prominent proponents of the free 
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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speech doctrine the Court has followed.9 Thomas Emerson's 
well-known list of reasons for the importance of freedom of 
speech to comes in large part from Mill, with a hint of Meiklejohn. 
Gerald Gunther, who quotes from Emerson's list, also identifies 
Mill and Meiklejohn as prominent sources for explaining the im-
portance of free speech. As I will show shortly, the Court's ap-
proach to freedom of speech embodies Mill's position. In 
addition, Harry Kalven's famous article on the New York Times 
libel case and Justice Brennan's article both made Meiklejohn a 
household name among students of the First Amendment.u 
In their writings on free speech, Mill and Meiklejohn both 
cite Socrates.tz Mill addresses the unsettling effect Socrates had 
on the Athenian citizens and the extreme action they took in re-
sponse, i.e., capital punishment. Meiklejohn attempts to recon-
cile Socrates's speech in the Apology with his refusal to allow his 
friends to spring him from jail in the Crito. This material is im-
portant for American constitutional law because our understand-
ing of freedom of speech depends upon our understanding of the 
relationship between political activity and the activity of thought 
generally, that is, philosophic reflection, scientific inquiry, and ar-
tistic expression. Our current free speech doctrines assume a 
fundamental harmony between these two activities. If this har-
mony cannot be assumed, as I intend to show with this examina-
tion of Mill, Meiklejohn, and Plato, then the Supreme Court's 
justifications for upholding free speech claims, and its very deci-
sions in certain cases, will need to be reconsidered. 
9. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Stefan Collini, ed., Cambridge U. Press, 1989); 
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 
(Harper & Brothers, 1960). 
10. Freedom of speech is important (1) "as a means of assuring individual self-fulfill-
ment"; (2) as "an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth"; (3) as 
"essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society"; and 
(4) as "a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of 
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 
Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-1 (Random House, 1970). 
11. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 996 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991); 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment", 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191; William Brennan, The Supreme Court and the 
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). 
12. Mill's discussion refers to the Athenian trial, the condemnation and the execu-
tion of Socrates, whereas Meiklejohn refers explicitly to Plato's account of these events. 
My discussion of Socrates will always mean Plato's Socrates, except where I refer to Xen-
ophon's account of Socrates' trial. 
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II. THE MODERN VIEW OF FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO FREE GOVERNMENT 
Mill's arguments in On Liberty concern civil liberty in gen-
eral, as his thesis indicates. 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple prin-
ciple, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society 
with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, 
whether the means used by physical force in the form of legal 
penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That princi-
ple is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action 
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.13 
Presenting the foundation for this principle in chapter three, Mill 
argues that "the free development of individuality is one of the 
leading essentials of well-being," and that "the evil is, that indi-
vidual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of 
thinking, as having any intrinsic worth .... "t4 Likening human 
nature to a "tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all 
sides," as opposed to "a machine to be built after a model," Mill 
argues that the more desires and feelings one has the more one 
has "of the raw material of human nature."ts Such a formulation 
suggests the need for strong government for security, as Hobbes 
argued. Mill, however, posits a social part of human nature as he 
claims that "there is a full equivalent in the better development 
of the social part of [that] nature, rendered possible by the re-
straint put upon the selfish part."t6 This seems to be Mill's way 
of denying any tension between the good of an individual and the 
common good. 
We thus approach Mill's argument for free speech in light of 
the overall object of the work: to minimize governmental and so-
cial control over individuals-at least over adults in advanced so-
cieties-in order to allow them to fully develop their unique 
natures. Mill argues that the free expression of opinions, in 
13. Mill, On Liberty at 13 (cited in note 9). This work was first published in 1859. 
The thesis applies to mature human beings and to advanced, or non-backward, societies 
(despotism may be appropriate for less advanced societies, if the end is their improve-
ment). The thesis argues for limits on social constraints as well as on legal, or criminal, 
ones. 
14. Id. at 57. 
15. Id. at 60. 
16. Id. at 63. 
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speech and writing, does not lead to any social harm. Mill goes 
on to put a limit on free speech which anticipates the Supreme 
Court's "clear and present danger" test: 
even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in 
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their ex-
pression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An 
opinion that com-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that pri-
vate property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply 
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment 
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the 
house of a com-dealer, or when handed about among the 
same mob in the form of a placard.17 
Mill makes a threefold classification for analyzing society's domi-
nant opinions in relation to "the liberty of thought and discus-
sion."ts First, the opinion which society wishes to suppress may 
be true, and those who wish to suppress it are incorrectly assum-
ing infallibility. He presents and responds to two counterargu-
ments here. In the first case, forbidding the propagation of error 
no more presupposes infallibility than any other form of acting 
on the basis of one's judgment. He responds that there is a sig-
nificant difference "between presuming an opinion to be true, 
because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been 
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting 
its refutation."t9 The second counterargument is from utility. To 
this claim Mill replies that "[t]he usefulness of an opinion is itself 
a matter of opinion" and that "[t]he truth of an opinion is part of 
its utility. "2o 
In the second case, the received opinion, society's ortho-
doxy, may be true, and the challenging opinions may be false. 
But this does not justify suppression of those challenging opin-
ions, Mill says, since rational beings must be in a position to 
know the truth, not simply hold it from authority. This is espe-
cially true in matters of "morals, religion, politics, social rela-
tions, and the business of life," where "three-fourths of the 
arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the ap-
pearances which favour some opinion different from it."21 Mill 
maintains that the arguments of adversaries must be heard not 
17. Id. at 56. This "mob rule" example, occurring within the civilized society that is 
supposedly advanced enough for full freedom of speech, seems to point to a broader 
problem than Mill is willing to acknowledge. 
18. That is the title to chapter two, which contains Mill's free speech argument. 
19. ld. at 22. 
20. Id. at 25. 
21. ld. at 38. 
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simply by able teachers but by the adversaries themselves, 
"presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they 
offer as refutations. "22 According to Mill, over time mankind 
will agree on more and more important doctrines. To the 
counterargument that only the few, not mankind in general, need 
to have full knowledge of "all that can be said either against or 
for their opinions," Mill replies that "in the present state of the 
world," given the widespread availability of writing, such a pro-
posal "is practically impossible. "23 
The third case presents a mixed situation, which is the most 
common: the "conflicting doctrines" may "share the truth be-
tween them. "24 In elaborating on this position, Mill refers to 
Rousseau's critique of the Enlightenment and then to Christian 
morality. I will return to this argument below. 
Mill paints an attractive picture of critical open-mindedness 
in the service of full human development. At the same time, his 
confidence in the progressive development of mankind, which 
seems to justify his ambition to reduce the authority of society as 
well as government, leads to unreasonable expectations. Con-
sider his discussion of the suppression of Socrates, of Jesus, and 
of Christianity by Marcus Aurelius. For Mill, the first two cases 
involve the State's suppression of a moral exemplar and the third 
case involves a moral man's misguided attempt to suppress a 
moral teaching foreign to him. Mill does not emphasize the dis-
tinctive teachings of Socrates, Jesus, or Rome, nor does he bewail 
the loss of great men. Rather he directs attention to the ill-
effects of suppression per se. His confidence in the benefits of 
individual development accounts for his position on truth. Ac-
cording to Mill, the dictum that "truth always triumphs over per-
secution" is "one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat 
after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all 
experience refutes."25 He does, however, believe that "when an 
opinion is true," men will periodically rediscover it until "some 
one of its reappearances falls upon a time when from favorable 
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head 
as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it."26 
22. Id. at 38. 
23. Id. at 39-40. This is an important point, since it seems to tell against any return 
to the position of classical political philosophy. It also has wider implications in the age of 
television. Still, if the assumed harmony, over time, between the few and the many does 
not occur, we may need to rethink the questions of practical application. 
24. ld. at 47. 
25. Id. at 31-32. 
26. Id. at 31. 
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So truth is resilient and suppression of opinion is harmful. 
But what is this thing called "truth" that gains adherence over 
time? Since human liberty is a natural good, the more people are 
given a chance to be free, the more they will develop their indi-
viduality. Moreover, freedom of thinking, and hence speaking 
and writing, 
is as much and even more indispensable, to enable average 
human beings to attain the mental stature which they are ca-
pable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual 
thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there 
never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intel-
lectually active people.27 
An intellectually active people must be involved in controversy 
over important subjects. Only then can "the mind of a people 
[be] stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse [be] given 
which [can raise] even persons of the most ordinary intellect to 
something of the dignity of thinking beings. "zs 
Truth for Mill, then, is the rights of man and the advance-
ment of science for the relief of man's estate, the truth of the 
Enlightenment. The political truths regarding rights, security, 
and full self-development are as likely to find favor with a people 
that is allowed to hear all opinions as scientific truths are likely to 
win the assent of disinterested scientists. The challenge is to get 
well intentioned people to see that coercion, social or govern-
mental, need not go beyond self-protection, since if it does, it is 
unnecessary and harmful to full self-development. 
Mill's position on coercion explains his treatment of Rous-
seau and his final treatment of Christianity, contained in part 
three of the argument. Rousseau argued, in part from the per-
spective of the ancient city, that the restoration of the sciences 
and arts, the Enlightenment, does not purify morals, because the 
sciences and the arts look up to the universalism of philosophy 
and science while morality reflects the particularism of one's city 
and the demands of citizenship.29 For Mill, Rousseau made a 
temporary contribution but he was more wrong than right: his 
"paradoxes ... explode[d] like bombshells in the midst, dislocat-
ing the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its ele-
ments to recombine in a better form and with additional 
27. Id. at 36. 
28. Id. at 36. 
29. See Rousseau, First Discourse in The First and Second Discourses (Royer D. 
Masters, ed. & Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters, trans., St. Martin's Press, 1964). 
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ingredients."3o In other words, Rousseau's criticism of the arts 
and sciences for their deleterious effects on the citizenry of a free 
republic did not require any fundamental reconsideration of indi-
vidual self-development and free society. 
Mill treats Christianity with more circumspection. He does 
not want to offend his audience by denying categorically that 
Christian morality is true. He does say that the Gospel's 
precepts are confined "to the particulars in which that morality 
was to be corrected, or superceded by a wider and higher [one]; 
expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossi-
ble to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impres-
siveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of 
legislation."3t Criticizing "so-called" Christian morality for being 
negative and passive rather than positive and active, Mill can still 
claim that 
the sayings of Christ ... are irreconcilable with nothing which 
a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is 
excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no 
greater violence to their language than has been done to it by 
all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical sys-
tem of conduct whatever. "32 
Mill was not the first modern philosopher to criticize Christi-
anity so tactfully that not every reader would understand, but he 
was the first to express such confidence in the positive effects of 
full and free discussion on important beliefs. He seems to have 
thought that zealous religious convictions would become a thing 
of the past. 
Alexander Meiklejohn is Mill's intellectual heir, applying 
some of Mill's ideas to specific cases and questions. In Free 
Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, first published in 
1948, Meiklejohn advocated a wider scope for freedom of speech 
than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test had allowed up to that time.33 Like Mill, 
Meiklejohn believes that when all opinions are heard, the results 
will be beneficial for civil society. His emphasis is on the citizens' 
responsibility for collective deliberation in a democratic form of 
government. Meiklejohn draws on the Constitution's preamble 
30. Mill, On Liberty at 48 (cited in note 9). 
31. Id. at 49-50. 
32. Id. at 51. 
33. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (cited in 
note 9). Part one of this book is a second edition of Meiklejohn's Free Speech and its 
Relation to Self-Govemmenr, part two contains additional papers. My discussion draws 
on the first part of the original work, which is entitled "The Rulers and the Ruled." 
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to interpret the First Amendment. "We, the People, acting to-
gether, either directly or through our representatives, make and 
administer law. We, the People, acting in groups or separately, 
are subject to the law. "34 Free speech cannot be abridged by the 
self-governing community, because it would deny to citizens "in-
formation or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism" which 
they need to make decisions.3s "It is that mutilation of the think-
ing process of the community against which the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution is directed."36 
Because it emphasizes matters of citizen deliberation, 
Meiklejohn's argument has reinforced the idea that the First 
Amendment only protects political speech. This position was 
criticized by scholars and in response Meiklejohn expanded his 
own definition of political speech.37 But Meiklejohn was right to 
emphasize the political speech of citizen critics of government, 
because otherwise freedom of speech becomes a part of a general 
individual liberty, a freedom from government. His insistence on 
a qualitative distinction between freedom of speech and a gen-
eral liberty, which is subject to regulation under the due process 
clause, has found some support in constitutionallaw.3s 
But Meiklejohn's use of the concept of the traditional town 
meeting to elaborate his free speech argument does not acknowl-
edge the significance of representation for modem free govern-
ment. The citizens choose a moderator who "calls the meeting to 
order," requires debaters to confine their remarks to "the ques-
tion before the house," maintains orderly discussion, and makes 
sure "that everything worth saying shall be said" (assuming, of 
course, that such is consistent with Robert's Rules of Order).39 
Using the example of a school board, Meiklejohn writes that 
questions concerning where to locate a school, who should teach, 
what should be taught are matters for full and free discussion and 
decision. No policy "shall be denied a hearing because it is on 
34. Id. at 15. 
35. ld. at 27. 
36. Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
37. Schauer notes the difficulties in defining political speech in Frederick F. Schauer, 
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 44-45,211 n.9 (Cambridge U. Press, 1982). Robert 
Bork has interpreted the Framers' intentions on free speech as limited to political speech, 
in his Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). 
Meiklejohn expanded the reach of political speech to include philosophy, science, litera-
ture, and the arts in The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 257. 
38. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation of Self-Government at 8-9 (cited in note 
33). This resembles the Supreme Court's "preferred position" approach to individual lib-
erties. Cf. Justice Stone's footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 
(1938). 
39. ld. at 24-26. 
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one side of the issue rather than another."40 He adds that "(n]o 
plan of action shall be outlawed because someone in control 
thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American. No speaker may be de-
clared 'out of order' because we disagree with what he intends to 
say."4t 
Since Meiklejohn has the Smith Act's outlawing of the Com-
munist Party in mind, we might ask whether he is referring to the 
proposal to bring about violent revolution or to the proposal to 
outlaw organizations advocating violent revolution as a rule of 
action. The abolition question might well come before the house, 
but it would be a representative legislature. How would the vio-
lent revolution question "come before the house"? If this is 
Meiklejohn's way of describing the people's right to alter or abol-
ish government, is that not a pre-political natural right which 
cannot be constitutionally recognized?42 And if the intention is 
to have all matters come before the sovereign people through 
their representatives, a legislative decision to outlaw the Commu-
nist Party does not prevent a reconsideration of such a measure 
in the future. But whenever the Supreme Court nullifies a law 
for abridging freedom of speech, it prohibits the citizen body 
from deliberating and deciding on the matter altogether. 
Meiklejohn's "self government" argument fails to make a persua-
sive case for such an extensive freedom from government.43 
Does Meiklejohn assume that full disclosure to rational 
adults, no matter what the arena, no matter how potentially dan-
gerous a secret association might be, will always produce benefi-
cial results and never produce irreparable harms? I think so. His 
interpretation of Socrates, from the Apology and Crito, illus-
trates his position and also reveals the weakness of his argument. 
According to Meiklejohn, "[i]n both dialogues, Plato is con-
sidering the right which a government has to demand obedience 
from its citizens .... The question is whether or not Socrates is in 
duty bound to obey the government. In the Apology the answer 
40. ld. at 27. 
41. Id. 
42. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government chapters XIII, XIX (J.W. 
Gough, ed., Barnes & Noble, 1966), the Declaration of Independence, and Lincoln's First 
Inaugural on this point. 
43. Frederick Schauer makes a similar point in his discussion of Meiklejohn's posi-
tion in Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry at 37-45 (cited in note 37). Schauer, follow-
ing Mill, thinks that the "fallibility argument" is the only persuasive reason for limiting 
government. He also cites Tocqueville, but that author is more sensitive to the special 
threats posed by associations, as opposed to sole individuals. See Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America 191, 193 (J.P. Mayer, ed., Doubleday, 1969). 
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is 'No.' In the Crito, the answer is 'Yes'.''44 Meiklejohn claims 
that Plato's Socrates has provided a consistent and defensible po-
sition toward law-abidingness and he finds that position in the 
American Constitution also. In the Apology, the city charges 
Socrates with corrupting the young and not believing in the gods 
of the city. Meiklejohn writes: 
On the evidence presented by a kind of un-Athenian Subver-
sive Activities Committee he is found guilty. His judges do 
not wish to put him to death, but they warn him that, unless he 
will agree to stop his teaching or to change its tenor, they must 
order his execution. And to this demand for obedience to a 
decree abridging his freedom of speech, Socrates replies with a 
flat and unequivocal declaration of disobedient independence. 
My teaching, he says, is not, in that sense, under the abridging 
control of the government. Athens is a free city. No official, 
no judge, he declares, may tell me what I shall, or shall not, 
teach or think. He recognizes that the government has the 
power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the 
content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified in-
dependence. 'Congress shall make no law abridging the free-
dom of speech,' he seems to be saying. 45 
Meiklejohn interprets Socrates's defense as a "First Amend-
ment" argument to his judges, to the effect that they have no 
right to inquire into his beliefs and teachings. I return to this 
below. 
In the Crito, Socrates refuses to accept his friend's offer of 
help to escape jail, and hence execution. Socrates constructed a 
dialogue between himself and the laws of Athens to show his 
friend that he had consented to live under those laws all his life, 
enjoying the rights and privileges of Athenian citizenship. How 
can he now, when his life is threatened, unilaterally remove his 
consent? Meiklejohn, accepting Socrates's argument at face 
value, argues that while government may not limit a man's free-
dom of thought, it can deprive someone of his life or property 
after giving him a fair trial. Hence, the lesson from Plato, accord-
ing to Meiklejohn, confirmed in the language of the First 
Amendment, is that civil disobedience based on belief or convic-
tion is permissible, but refusal to accept whatever punishment 
follows from due process of law is not.46 
44. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government at 22 (cited in note 
33). 
45. Id. 
46. Meiklejohn thus anticipates Martin Luther King's famous argument for civil 
disobedience. 
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In summary, Mill and Meiklejohn offer a defense of freedom 
of speech which draws on Plato's Apology of Socrates. Both as-
sume that Athens was wrong and Socrates, as an individual as-
serting his rights, was right. Thming to Plato, I want to show that 
the correct interpretation of these two dialogues, by themselves 
and in conjunction with the Republic, yields a more complicated, 
but also more instructive teaching. 
Ill. FREE SPEECH IN CLASSICAL POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: A RECONSIDERATION OF 
PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 
AND CRITO 
In Plato's version of the trial, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon 
make the following charge: "Socrates does injustice by cor-
rupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the 
city believes, but in other diamonia [ daimonic, or godlike, things 
or beings] that are novel."47 After Socrates is found guilty, by a 
vote of approximately 280-220, the accusers, on behalf of the city, 
propose the death penalty. The jury, after hearing Socrates pro-
pose "tenure for life" as his "penalty," chooses death.4s The two 
substantive questions are, what does Socrates claim for himself 
and what does he allow the city? Before examining them, how-
ever, I consider the character of this dialogue and Socrates's re-
marks about his defense speech and speech in general. 
The Apology is the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates 
is presented in a conversation with the entire city of Athens, that 
is, with the randomly selected five hundred-man jury. In all the 
other dialogues in which Socrates appears, he speaks with a se-
lect few. Socrates insists that his interlocutor and he must be the 
judges, not some external jury, and that question and answer, 
rather than long speeches, be employed. Furthermore, in the 
Phaedrus, Socrates criticizes writing as frozen speech, which says 
the same thing to everyone, and he praises speaking for allowing 
the speaker to tailor his remarks to the specific audience. 
Socrates has a popular and hostile audience in the Apology. 
Such an audience will affect his ability to instruct his listeners, 
47. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates 73 (24b-c) (Thomas G. West & 
Grace Starry West, trans., Cornell U. Press, 1984). 
48. If the death penalty and the criminal process are both taken out of the case, we 
can imagine a modem version of Socrates' condition: having a teacher and scholar who is 
up for tenure defend himself against the charges that his teachings, opinions, or beliefs 
are detrimental to the students and harmful to the larger community. The American 
Association of University Professors' principles on academic freedom follow the argu-
ments of Mill and Meiklejohn. 
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and hence it will affect what he says. Socrates claims at the be-
ginning of his speech that unlike his accusers, who are clever 
speakers but liars, he will tell the simple unadorned truth; it is, he 
claims, the only way he knows, since at seventy this is his first 
time in a law court as a defendant. Socrates implies that all that 
is necessary for justice is truth telling. But at the end of the dia-
logue, he contradicts his first statement by indicating that he 
could have spoken differently. Now it appears that if he had 
wanted to save his life at all costs, he could have spoken shame-
lessly, saying what needed to be said to please his hearers.49 The 
latter statement is consistent with Socrates's remark about the 
flexibility of speaking, whereas the first statement about simply 
telling the truth is not. Socrates's two accounts of his manner of 
speaking give some indication of the meaning of Socratic irony 
and suggest the need to approach the critical arguments on the 
charges carefully. 
Turning to his defense, Socrates begins with the corruption 
charge. He asks who makes the youth better. After first saying 
that the laws do, Meletus (in response to Socrates's prodding) 
gives the democratic answer that the citizen judges ("all of 
them") are able to educate the young.5o Socrates notes that in 
the training of horses it is the few who know, rather than the 
many who do not, who make them better. Socrates suggests two 
possible reference points for rearing the young: on the basis of 
knowledge of human excellence simply or on the basis of what a 
given political association, or body politic, looks up to. 
The second charge against Socrates is that he teaches the 
youth "not [to] believe[ ] in the gods in whom the city believes, 
but in other daimonia that are novel."51 His response to this 
charge is very different from what Meiklejohn says it is. After 
getting Meletus to expand on the charge by asserting that he is an 
atheist,52 Socrates can point out that Meletus has contradicted his 
own indictment, according to which Socrates believes in, or in-
troduces, daimonia, godlike things or beings, that are novel.53 
According to Leo Strauss, "[t]his refutation is so beautiful be-
49. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 93 (38d) (cited in note 47). 
50. Id. at 74 (24e). 
51. Id. at 73 (24b-c). 
52. [S] "Or do you assert that I myself do not believe in gods at all and that I teach 
this to others?" [M] "This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." Id. at 76 
(26c). 
53. Id. at 76-78 (26b-27d). The daimon is Plato's Socrates's ironic way of describing 
some of his actions, such as a decision to stay out of political life; he refers to it later in the 
dialogue as not having opposed his form of defense. 
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cause it leaves entirely open whether Socrates believes in the 
gods of the city."54 
Perhaps Socrates does not believe in the gods of the city and 
the city may rightfully be concerned about that. Unlike Mill and 
Meiklejohn, Plato's Socrates does not expect, or even think, that 
a philosopher can live in full harmony with a city, i.e., a political 
community. The complex relationship between philosophy, or 
the life of the mind, and politics involves more than the city's 
having a claim on its citizens, however, because Socrates has a 
claim on the city. Socrates presents his account of his way of life 
by constructing a hypothetical argument on behalf of the jurors: 
that they will let him go on condition "that you no longer spend 
time in this investigation or philosophize; and if you are caught 
doing this you will die. "55 To this Socrates responds 
I, men of Athens, salute you and love you, but I will obey the 
god rather than you; as long as I breathe and am able to, I will 
certainly not stop philosophizing, and I will exhort you and 
explain this to whomever of you I happen to meet, and I will 
speak just the sorts of things I am accustomed to: 'Best of 
men, you are an Athenian, from the city that is greatest and 
best reputed for wisdom and strength: are you not ashamed 
that you care for having as much money as possible, and repu-
tation, and honor, but that you neither care for nor give 
thought to prudence, and truth, and how your soul will be the 
best possible?'.56 
In this popular presentation of philosophy, the emphasis is on 
exhortation rather than inquiry, the care of the soul is moral 
rather than intellectual, and the activity, like law-abidingness, 
can be expected of everyone. On this formulation, there is no 
inherent tension between the life of philosophy and the demands 
of politics. If Plato's Socrates were serious about this account, 
both Mill and Meiklejohn would be right to portray the conflict 
between Athens and Socrates as they do: that an overzealous 
democratic city made a tragic mistake because it was unable to 
recognize the moral and intellectual contribution that Socrates 
was making to the city. 
54. Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito, in Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Polit-
ical Philosophy 44 (U. of Chi. Press, 1983). This is especially noteworthy; the Greek word 
which is translated "believe in" ("nomizein") can also mean "publicly acknowledge" or 
"worship," and in Xenophon's version of Socrates' defense, he has Socrates deny the 
charge by asserting that many Athenians have seen him sacrificing to the gods. Socrates' 
Defence to the Jury, in IV Works of Xenophon 646-47 (Loeb Classical Lib., Harv. U. 
Press, 1923). 
55. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 81 (29d-e) (cited in note 47). 
56. Id. 
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But there is abundant evidence in the Apology, which is fur-
ther confirmed by the Republic, that Socrates's popular presenta-
tion of his philosophic way of life cannot be taken literally. First, 
we noted how the simple unadorned truth does not necessarily 
get itself accepted by a democratic jury, precisely because, as 
Meletus showed, a democratic people is suspicious of any claim 
that any one or few persons possess political wisdom. Second, 
Socrates's refusal to address the relationship between the city's 
gods and his way of life suggests that there is not a simple har-
mony between the requirements of politics and the life of the 
mind.s7 Socrates acknowledges this shortly afterward by first lik-
ening himself to "some gadfly" who awakens a "great and well-
born horse who is rather sluggish" and then by saying that he has 
had to avoid political life to survive. 
For know well, men of Athens, if I had long ago attempted to 
be politically active, I would long ago have perished . . . . 
Rather, if someone who really fights for the just is going to 
preserve himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him 
to lead a private rather than a public life.ss 
After Socrates is found guilty, he explains again why he can-
not keep silent: 
[I]f I say that this even happens to be a great good for a 
human being-to make speeches every day about virtue and 
the other things about which you hear me conversing and ex-
amining both myself and others-and that the unexamined life 
is not worth living for a human being, you will be persuaded 
by me still less when I say these things.s9 
This account of philosophy does not include exhortation and 
does not imply that the activity is embraceable by all. Socrates 
did not spend his time conversing with the man on the street. 
The Republic gives a fuller account of why the philosophic life is 
necessarily in conflict with the demands of politics. The desires 
of most human beings are for goods that are connected to the 
particularity of body and hence cannot be truly shared. On the 
other hand, if political life is to reflect true human dignity, it 
needs to look up to the universal human capacity for thought and 
57. The Republic does not teach the contrary, since the perfect regime, in which the 
philosopher rules, requires, among other things, the elimination of the family, which is 
contrary to natural desire and hence not possible. In addition, the few philo~ophers in the 
perfect city are different in kind from the many non·philosophers, whose hves are based 
on opinion, not knowledge. See Republic VII (Allan Bloom trans., B~ic ~ooks, 1968). 
58. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 82 (30e) (cited m note 47). 
59. Id. at 92 (38a). 
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reflection on the nature of things. That activity both transcends 
politics but also ultimately dignifies it. In that sense, Socrates 
was not speaking foolishly when he described himself as a gadfly 
or when he proposed what amounted to "lifetime tenure" on the 
part of the city as what he deserved from the city. 
Since Meiklejohn attempted to reconcile the Crito with the 
Apology, I want to consider that dialogue briefly. In it, Socra-
tes's good friend comes to see him in jail and urges him to go 
along with an escape plan that he and his friends have devised. 
The reason Socrates gives for not going along may have more to 
do with Crito than with the truth. After all, at the end of the 
Apology Socrates first spoke to his condemners, chastising them 
for their foolishness: 
For the sake of a little time, men of Athens, you will get a 
name and be charged with the responsibility, by those wishing 
to revile the city, for having killed Socrates, a wise man .... 
For you see that my age is already far advanced in life and 
close to death.60 
Crito's own personal expression of concern for Socrates plus the 
absence of any treatment of philosophy in the dialogue6t suggest 
that Socrates is addressing a non-philosophic friend. Hence he 
makes an argument from the laws which abstracts from the dif-
ference, highlighted in the Apology, between those who make 
the laws and those who might have true knowledge of politics. If 
the truly just man must lead a private life, how can it be said that 
the just Socrates has been reared by the laws, and therefore owes 
a pious duty to obey the laws? In his speech in the Apology, 
Socrates indicated that he would have disobeyed a hypothetical 
law explicitly prohibiting philosophy. In the Crito, he argues for 
categorical law-abidingness. The argument has a surface plausi-
bility, apparently enough to make Crito feel better about Socra-
tes's execution. In light of Socrates's remark about his age at the 
end of the Apology, we are invited to wonder what he would 
have done if he had faced execution at age thirty-five. Contrary 
to Meiklejohn, Plato teaches that the tension between the re-
quirements of political life and the good of the individual cannot 
be resolved by allowing full freedom of expression as long as 
criminal punishment for that expression follows due process. 
Nor can we assume that the special claim Socrates made on be-
60. ld. at 92 (3&). 
61. The word "soul'" is noticeably absent precisely when one would expect it from 
the context; see id. at 105 (47d). Leo Strauss points this out in Plato's Apology of Socrates 
and Crito at 58 (cited in note 54). 
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half of his distinctive way of life, philosophy, can be extended to 
every individual's chosen way of life. 
CONCLUSION: APPLYING CLASSICAL POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY TO FREE SPEECH AND FREE 
GOVERNMENT UNDER LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The Supreme Court's free speech doctrines assume the best 
results from the widest possible freedom of expression and fear 
the worst results if any distinctions are made on the basis of the 
content of the ideas expressed. Likewise, the Court does not dis-
tinguish between an individual and an association, between 
speech and symbolic expression, or between civil speech and vul-
gar speech. Perhaps we should not hold Mill and Meiklejohn re-
sponsible for every development in our constitutional law on free 
speech, but their arguments support the contention that the ful-
lest freedom of expression is good and that governmental or so-
cial restraints on individuals are only justified by an immediate 
threat to security. They favor freedom as an unqualified good 
because they assume a fundamental harmony between the life of 
inquiry and political life. Since they both refer to Socrates for 
support, I examined the Apology and Crito to show that Plato's 
account does not support their position and moreover that 
Plato's account of a tension between the demands of a healthy 
political life and the good of the individual is superior to theirs. 
Plato provides further evidence for his position in book eight of 
the Republic, where Socrates describes democracy as the regime 
of freedom, which means the people look up to the "equality of 
the pleasures. "62 According to Socrates, such a view of the good 
life is accompanied by the following speeches: 
[N]aming shame simplicity, they push it out with dis-
honor, a fugitive; calling moderation cowardliness and spat-
tering it with mud, they banish it; persuading that measure and 
orderly expenditure are rustic and illiberal, they join with 
many useless desires in driving them over the frontier .... 
Now, once they have emptied and purged these from the soul 
of the man whom they are seizing and initiating in great rites, 
they proceed to return insolence, anarchy, wastefulness, and 
shamelessness from exile, in a blaze of light, crowned and ac-
companied by a numerous chorus, extolling and flattering 
62. Republic VIII (cited in note 57). 
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them by calling insolence good education; anarchy, freedom; 
wastefulness, magnificence; and shamelessness, courage.63 
This critique of freedom implies a need for restrictions more se-
vere than are compatible with liberal democracy. We should not 
reject the critique categorically, however. We learn from Plato, 
not Mill, that the fully developed individual can take various 
forms, and that moderate regimes cannot be indifferent to the 
range and intensity of those forms. At the same time, Plato's 
Socrates reminds us that democracy's toleration of a variety of 
human types allows the life of inquiry to flourish also. Liberals 
today place too much reliance on toleration, however, with the 
result that they blur the distinction between toleration and 
approval. 
The success of liberal democracy, whose foundations lie in 
modern political philosophy, has produced two consequences. 
First, we enjoy the benefits of virtually unlimited intellectual in-
quiry, but the consignment of religion and other accounts of how 
one should live to the private sphere, beyond the authority of 
government, has led to a regime of tolerance that is often unable 
to defend itself against intolerance. Second, the liberal project 
has succeeded in minimizing the effect of moral constraints on 
individual expression and action, but instead of the flowering of 
the intellectual development of the people at large that Mill pre-
dicted, we have witnessed less appreciation of true intellectual 
diversity of opinion and we have been forced to tolerate cruder 
and more offensive expression. We can no longer rely on reli-
gious education for the cultivation of moderate habits. And any 
attempt by government to give support to such habits runs up 
against a widespread distrust of such authority, among First 
Amendment scholars64 as well as the population at large. 
Returning to the Supreme Court, I do not think that every 
major decision in the area of freedom of speech was wrongly de-
cided and needs to be overturned. I do think, however, that the 
ramifications of the Brandenburg "incitement" test, which in-
cludes the subjective "clear and present danger" as well as the 
objective "incitement to imminent violence," components, have 
not been fully considered. Interpreted fairly, the test makes gov-
ernment wait too long before it can take appropriate action 
against serious threats to national security or public safety.6s In 
63. Id. at 239 (560c-561b). 
64. See Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry at 81 (cited in note 37). 
65. The Court's decision in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), sustaining the regula-
tion permitting the Secretary of State to revoke a passport on national security grounds, 
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addition, an inflexible application of the "content neutrality" 
doctrine to government action in all contexts, including public 
education, gives the impression that government is unable to 
stand for anything. And fmally, surely not every form of commu-
nication of a message, be it profanity in the street or nude danc-
ing, should receive the high level of protection that Meiklejohn 
or Mill would apply to citizen deliberation on governmental mat-
ters.66 Since many of these cases involve "blowing off steam" 
which offends a given community, would not a balancing of inter-
ests test be more appropriate?67 
If we wish to strengthen liberal constitutionalism, we must 
be sure that our treatment of freedom of speech gives due weight 
to the claims of individual rights. But those claims should be 
considered with a realistic appreciation of the benefits of free-
dom of speech in liberal democracy along with a recognition of 
the importance of civility among the citizenry and responsibility 
in the political branches of government. 
was right, since former agent Agee was planning to expose CIA agents, but did it pass the 
Brandenburg test? After including the case in his book, Gerald Gunther, a strong sup-
porter of freedom of speech, asks whether Brandenburg should be applied "to the com-
munication of information that may lead to criminal acts." Gunther, Constitutional Law 
at 1066 (cited in note 11 ). 
66. See Justice Stevens opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 
(1976) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
67. In a recent book which challenges the conventional wisdom, Robert Nagel ar-
gues that "the use of principle requires courts to protect speech even in cases in which the 
immediate advantages are questionable and the social disadvantages are clear." He 
doubts "that courts actually promote free speech by engaging in principled decision mak-
ing." Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judi-
cial Review 39, 40 (U. of Calif. Press, 1989). While I find his approach refreshing, I think 
the Supreme Court can promote free speech and free government by engaging in a full 
and candid balancing of governmental interests against free speech claims. 
